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resident Sarkozy’s proposed 
Union for the Mediterranean 
(or UMed) has so far been 
poorly conceived and, to say the least, 
awkwardly presented politically. However this does 
not mean that nothing good can come of it. The 
Barcelona process and its confusing combination 
with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
have neither been a disaster nor a brilliant success. 
There is a case for streamlining a single European 
Mediterranean policy, rationalising and properly 
integrating Barcelona, the ENP and new ideas that 
the UMed initiative may produce. Both Italy and 
Spain as well as the South Mediterranean states 
themselves appear concerned not to undermine the 
existing structures (Barcelona and ENP). Steps could 
be made to lighten the overweight participation of 
the EU and all its 27 member states in too many 
meetings with too many participants and too few 
results, drawing on models that have emerged in the 
EU’s Northern maritime regions. However, the EU 
as a whole will not agree to delegate the essential 
initiative on strategic matters to just its Southern 
coastal states – as has been made clear in recent 
exchanges between President Sarkozy and 
Chancellor Merkel. In addition the EU will also want 
to maintain a balance between its Northern and 
Southern priorities, and if the UMed becomes a new 
impetus for the South, an equivalent but different 
policy move can be contemplated for the EU’s East 
European neighbours  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A very rough start 
President Sarkozy originally advanced the idea of a 
‘Union of the Mediterranean’
1 during his election 
night press conference on 6 May 2007. He later 
developed the idea at a speech in Tangier on 23 
October 2007, according to which just the coastal 
states of the Mediterranean would aim at a “political, 
economic and cultural union” … “of which our 
children will be proud.”
2 The proposal is thus 
presented as something of strategic and historical 
importance. Followed through operationally, and 
taking Sarkozy’s words at face value, it seems that 
the project would have implied marginalising the 
EU’s major policy investments in the region 
(Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood 
Policy – ENP), while ‘privatising’ the essential 
initiative for this sphere of EU policy for a sub-set of 
member states.  
The proposal encountered criticism at the highest 
levels.  
First, Turkey immediately rejected the idea that this 
might be considered an alternative to acceding to the 
European Union, supposing that this was at least 
partly the intention.  
                                                      
1 The initiative was first called “Union of (rather than for) 
the Mediterranean”, the change apparently signalling that a 
less ambitious institutionalisation is now envisaged. 
2http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?lang=fr&mod
e=view&cat_id=7&press_id=572  
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Second, on 5 December 2007, Chancellor Merkel 
rejected the idea that policy for the Mediterranean 
should be restricted to the coastal states:  
This would create a situation I would qualify 
as dangerous. A situation could be created 
where Germany would be drawn to Central 
and Eastern Europe and France to the 
Mediterranean. This would create tension that 
I would not like.
3 
Third, even the Slovenian Presidency in office 
followed on 17 January 2008 with:  
We do not need a duplication of institutions 
that would compete with EU institutions, 
and that would cover part of the EU and 
part of the neighbourhood.
4 
The model of the early days of the European 
Communities was invoked in Sarkozy’s Tangier 
speech, advocating Jean Monnet’s ‘functionalism’ of 
the European Coal and Steel Community that led on 
to greater political constructions. But Monnet was 
starting from scratch. The Mediterranean has over ten 
years of the Euro-Mediterranean policy and systemic 
development, which was implicitly being written off 
as being of little significance or value.   
This is not the only occasion when President Sarkozy 
has made an impulsive and ill-defined proposal on a 
subject of strategic importance of the EU, his 
proposal to dilute the independence of the European 
Central Bank having been another one. Both 
propositions put France’s most important diplomatic 
asset at risk, namely its alliance with Germany. 
At least France’s secretary of state for European 
affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, understands why any 
ambitious and exclusive version of Sarkozy’s Union 
would be a strategic mistake of the first order, as he 
stated in Le Figaro on 25 January 2008 (our 
translation): 
The great project of civilisation, it is 
European. If we want another one, we must 
say so. If on the occasion of our meeting on 
the Mediterranean, which will be organised 
on 13-14 July in Paris, we give the 
impression to our partners, notably German, 
of wanting to privilege one union alongside 
                                                      
3 Speech before Konvent für Deutschland, 5 December 
2007. 
4  Slovene Prime Minister Janez Jansa speaking before the 
European Parliament, 17 January 2008. 
another, we will have great difficulty to 
preserve the credibility of the French 
presidency. We are placed before a strategic 
choice: either privilege an ambitious French 
presidency, assuring continuity of the 
European dossiers, while giving them all 
necessary impulsions. Or we consider that the 
Mediterranean Union, as such, is more 
important than the rest. But at that moment 
our partners could ask us to choose. 
On 31 January, there was another exchange between 
Sarkozy and Merkel. Sarkozy was reported as saying: 
All EU member states should be able to 
participate, but that those countries which 
wish to move faster should not be 
prevented from doing so by those moving 
at a slower place.
5  
These remarks hardly helped. What does moving 
faster or slower mean? Moving where? To a new 
political, economic and cultural Union of the 
Mediterranean? Would some EU member states be 
members of this Union before others, but catch up 
later? The political criticisms can be coupled to 
criticisms regarding a lack of technical 
professionalism. After over half a year the proposal 
had still not taken any professionally recognisable 
shape, other than the fact that it would be a ‘project 
of projects’ with a long list of technical agencies in 
such fields as environment, energy, transport etc. 
(French note of 19 January 2008, see Box 2 below).  
On 3 March 2008, President Sarkozy and Chancellor 
Merkel met and announced that they had resolved 
their differences, and that the subject would be 
discussed at the forthcoming European Council 
meeting of 13-14 March. While details are not 
available, it is reported that the proposal is now for 
the UMed initiative to be a project of the EU, which 
will, according to Chancellor Merkel “carry the 
Barcelona process to a higher level.”
6 References 
have been made to the model of the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States, in which the coastal states are full 
members and other states observers, but there still 
seems to be uncertainty over whether the non-
Mediterranean EU states will have equal 
participation or not.
7 Moreover on 6 March it was 
reported that Sarkozy asserted that the Presidency of 
                                                      
5 Financial Times, 31 January 2008. 
6 Agence France Press, 4 March 2008. 
7 EurActiv.com, 4 March 2008. Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean | 3 
the UMed would be shared by one Coastal 
Mediterranean state of the EU and one South 
Mediterranean state, which poses issues of 
compatibility with EU practice, if indeed the UMed 
is to be fully integrated into EU policy.
8     
The Italians and Spanish have also expressed 
concerns been that the project should not undermine 
the Barcelona process, but strengthen it. 
Of the South Mediterranean states, the Heads of State 
of Algeria and Morocco have made public statements 
on the Union of the Mediterranean in speeches before 
President Sarkozy on the occasion of his visits to 
their countries. Decoding diplomatic language, the 
King of Morocco first stressed the importance for his 
country of making a new advanced agreement with 
the EU in the framework of the ENP and then the 
need for the new initiative to be in “perfect 
articulation with the desired consolidation of the 
Barcelona process.” President Bouteflika of Algeria 
said he would not be “insensitive’ to the project to 
the extent that its contours and objectives were 
defined alongside the organisms already in place (i.e. 
Barcelona process), but stressed that there were 
obstacles to be overcome, notably the resolution of 
the Israel-Palestinian and Western Sahara conflicts.  
The general message coming from the South 
Mediterranean is that the UMed project remains to be 
specified before there could be clear responses, but in 
any case it should not undermine positive aspects of 
the Barcelona process and/or of the ENP. The idea 
that the UMed might be the leading strategic project 
for the region, undertaken by just the coastal states, 
wins no apparent support, while the need for a proper 
articulation with the Barcelona process and the ENP 
is an explicit concern.
9  
2.    Expectations and results 
The French Ambassador to the EU, Pierre Sellal, 
recently explained to the Assemblée nationale that: 
The reflection of the President of the 
Republic on the Union of the Mediterranean 
is inspired by the insufficiencies of the 
Mediterranean policy undertaken so far. We 
all observe that the actions undertaken in the 
                                                      
8 Le Monde, 6 March 2008. 
9 See, for example, Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandro 
Lorca, “La Union Mediterranea: una union en busca de 
proyecto”, Working Paper No. 13/2008, Real Instituto 
Elcano, Madrid.  
framework of the neighbourhood policy and 
the Barcelona process have not yet produced 
the expected results
 .
10 
But what results should have been expected, in 
proportion to the strength of the policy contributions 
made by the Southern states themselves and then by 
the EU as a whole? And how should the results be 
assessed?  
A very high standard of achievement would be for 
the South Mediterranean countries to have matched 
the political and economic transformation observed 
in Central and Eastern Europe since the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall; or the economic performance of 
much of Asia in recent decades. Alternatively, a very 
low standard would be for the region to have just 
done better than its close neighbours, notably in the 
Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.  
Politically it is evident that the South Mediterranean 
has not been progressing towards European 
democratic standards in the same way as Central and 
Eastern Europe – as the ratings regarding political 
freedoms, civil liberties and press freedoms in Table 
1 demonstrate. On the contrary its record on political 
freedoms is as bad as sub-Saharan Africa. On the 
other hand the South Mediterranean has avoided 
several other really black political scenarios: the 
radical Islamic republic model of Iran, or the ultra-
repressive Islamic monarchical conservatism of 
Saudi Arabia. Its authoritarian regimes have at least 
avoided the tragic cocktail of the failed state, 
anarchy, civil war and the genocide now observed in 
so many states of sub-Saharan Africa 
The South Mediterranean has not at all been a region 
of failed states, but become rather one of smarter 
authoritarianism, co-opting elites with business 
interests, allowing some token political pluralism 
while repressing any potentially serious opposition 
movement. A recent report argues that “Arab regimes 
have become proficient at containing and disarming 
democracy promotion.”
 11 
. 
                                                      
10  Assemblée nationale, Commission des affaires 
étrangères, « Audition, commune avec la délégation pour 
l’Union européenne, de M. Pierre Sellal, représentant 
permanent de la France auprès de l’Union européenne, sur 
la présidence française de l’Union européenne  », 29 
janvier 2008, Compte rendu n° 34 (our translation).  
11 Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the 
Arab World”, Analysis Paper No. 13, Brookings 
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Table 1. Political performance of Mediterranean countries        
           
  Political rights*  Civil liberties*  Corruption**   Press freedom***    
Mediterranean  5.4 4.8  6.4 4.6     
Central & Eastern Europe  2.3 2.2  5.9 1.6     
Asia  3.9 3.5  6.4 4.6     
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.3 4.9  7.2 3.4     
Sources:            
* Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008, (1-most free, 7-least free).       
** Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2007, 0-highly clean, 10-highly corrupt. The original source rated 
with the reverse order, with 0 as the most corrupt. Here the ratings have been reversed so as to be comparable to the other data 
shown.   
*** Reporters without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007, (0-free, the highest number - the least free). 
 
 
Table 2. Economic performance – % GDP growth% of 
Mediterranean countries and other regions*       
          
  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Mediterranean**  2.2  1.8  3.6 5.6 4.6 4.5 
Central & Eastern Europe***  4.3  4.5  5.2 6.6 5.9 6.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa       3.7   3.4   4.1   5.5   5.7   5.6  
South Asia   4.6  3.7   7.6   8.0  8.6   8.6  
East Asia & Pacific   6.6  7.9   8.8  9.0    9.0   9.4 
Sources:                   
*Data based on World Bank database.             
**Mediterranean: Barcelona process countries.           
***Central & Eastern Europe: new EU members (without Cyprus, Malta) + Balkans + Belarus +Ukraine.   
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Economically the region has been achieving 
moderate growth rates, while categorically less 
than the performance of the Asian tigers, with 
many of them sustaining near double-digit growth 
rates, their record is also significantly less than that 
of the Central and East European countries, and 
even marginally less than that of the average of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Table 2). The South 
Mediterranean was only a few years ago not much 
poorer than Central and Eastern Europe, but has 
now been left way behind. But the Mediterranean 
has not experienced economic disasters, except in 
the case of Palestine. 
This moderate performance, neither brilliant nor 
disastrous, seems understandable when one looks at 
the big picture. The South Mediterranean’s 
proximity to Europe translates into a certain 
socialisation effect in relation to the political and 
economic models of modern Europe. Have the 
legacies of history been on balance a factor for 
partial convergence, with the ebb and flow of 
European and Islamic empires over the centuries, 
even if the most recent colonisation episode leaves 
still bitter traces? Has the depth of Europe’s current 
engagement with the region, including the 
important population linkages through the 
diasporas present in Europe, positively influenced 
social attitudes and aspirations? These linkages 
seem to have been important enough to have 
prevented contamination by the worse political 
fates prevalent in its neighbouring regions in the 
Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. These 
propositions are hard to prove, but would seem not 
implausible. In which case the EU’s Mediterranean 
policies have not been in vain, even if 
improvements need to be sought.  
Do the policy-makers have the right to have 
expected a much higher standard of results?  
On the political side the EU and its member states 
have not really tried to push for political reforms, 
except in the most timid, technical or just 
declaratory ways, and have hardly reacted at all to 
the manifest abuse of human rights and political 
repression observed in much of the region. The 
mainly authoritarian regimes have themselves 
given priority to retaining control, frequently 
repressing opposition movements. The EU and 
member states are criticised by democratic Islamist 
movements in the region for ignoring their claims 
to greater political participation.
12 Who could really 
have expected better results from these status quo 
                                                      
12 M. Emerson and R. Youngs (eds), Political Islam and 
European Foreign Policy – Perspectives from Muslim 
Democrats of the Mediterranean, CEPS Paperback, 
2007. 
policies, leaving aside idle wishful thinking? The 
EU’s policies of ‘benign neglect’ may in fact be 
contributing to something less benign, leaving 
frustrated Islamic moderates under pressure from 
forces pushing for renewed Islamic radicalisation.   
On the economic side the Southern Mediterranean 
countries are mostly still locked in closed systems 
of economic privilege, with pervasive links 
between major corporations and the personal 
interests of government leaders. Economic 
potential is still being stifled at home. For its part 
the EU has refused to include agriculture in its free 
trade agreements, thus excluding the sector where 
the South Mediterranean has real comparative 
advantages, whereas the industrial and service 
sectors -– where the EU has overwhelming 
strengths  is being opened for free trade.  
Might an action of the coastal states of the 
Mediterranean be expected to overcome these 
fundamental constraints on effective reform 
processes? It has to be observed that the Southern 
EU member states are among the most cautious 
about raising political reform issues, and they are 
also the most protective lobby in the EU in limiting 
the liberalisation of agricultural trade. Moreover 
the formulation of the Sarkozy proposal as a 
‘project of projects’, with its low level technical 
content, seems to minimise concern for either 
political or economic policy reform. 
3.  Institutional & organisational issues 
A plausible architecture of the EU’s cooperation in 
the Mediterranean can be based on two non-
controversial and entirely constructive 
propositions:  
•  There are intrinsic reasons for the coastal states 
of enclosed seas to cooperate on many matters 
linked to their common geography. 
•  Where such maritime regions are on the 
periphery of the EU, there is a need for multi-
tiered cooperation at the three levels – coastal 
regions, coastal states and the EU as a whole.   
For the Mediterranean much has been achieved 
along these lines. However a common critique is 
that the system of the Barcelona process (or Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership – EMP) and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have 
become too cumbersome and bureaucratic. These 
critiques have to be confronted. 
The Barcelona process has, since its inception in 
1995, led to the signing of Association Agreements 
between the EU and the Southern partner states, 
including agreements for the progressive 
introduction of free trade and a wide-ranging  
6 | Michael Emerson 
 
agenda for looser cooperation. At the multilateral 
level the Barcelona process has seen the convening 
of ministerial meetings under no less than 14 
headings (Box 1). 
Box 1. Domains of policy in which there have been 
ministerial meetings at the level of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership 
1.  Foreign affairs 
2.  Economic and financial affairs 
3.  Environment 
4.  Energy 
5.  Transport 
6.  Industry 
7.  Agriculture 
8.  Trade 
9.  Water  
10.  Employment 
11.  Culture 
12.  Migration 
13.  Tourism 
14.  Health 
 
Each of these ministerial meetings will nowadays 
involve 39 delegations: 27 EU member states, 11 
partner states of the Mediterranean
13 and the 
Commission. Ministerial meetings will usually be 
prepared by meetings of senior officials in the same 
format. There are too many meetings with too 
many participants that achieve too little.  
In addition the ENP has deepened bilateral 
cooperation with most of the Southern partner 
states since 2004, with detailed Action Plans setting 
out political, economic and security agendas. It is 
envisaged that this process will lead in the case of 
the most advanced partner states to the negotiation 
of new ‘Advanced Agreements’, for which 
Morocco is already identified as the first candidate. 
However for the time being the Action Plans of the 
ENP are overloaded with too many thin 
prescriptions. 
For the Summit meetings in July to launch the 
UMed the invitations are apparently going to be 
sent to an even wider set of Mediterranean 
countries, including all the coastal states of the 
Adriatic Sea (Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and 
Albania). This means bringing four Balkan states 
that are engaged in implementing or negotiating 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, which 
                                                      
13 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Syria. To these founding 
partner states Albania and Mauritania have recently been 
added, but not to the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
which adds a new confusion to the geography of the 
EU’s Mediterranean policy. Libya could become the 12
th 
Barcelona state.  
are premised on the perspective of full membership 
with the EU, into a common project with the 
Barcelona states. This enlarged Mediterranean 
concept seem very puzzling, since it will mean 
meetings encumbered with even more seats around 
the table and additional confusions over its political 
purpose in relation to the Barcelona process and 
ENP.  
There is surely a case for rationalisations and 
improvements to what has become an exceedingly 
complex construction already with EMP, ENP and 
other initiatives such as the 5+5 grouping.
14 The 
Sarkozy initiative could translate into a push for a 
single rationalised system and name (‘Union for the 
Mediterranean’ is entirely positive), and scrapping 
the confusing terminology of EMP and ENP. The 
UMed could be a multi-tiered structure, in which 
all parties – regions, coastal and other member 
states and the EU institutions – find their place 
according to rational principles of subsidiarity (to 
which we return below).  
In so doing the Eastern and Southern branches of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy could be each 
allowed to see increased differentiation, albeit 
building upon the assets they have in common by 
way of the system of contractual relations between 
the EU and the partner states. The Arab 
Mediterranean states have little in common by way 
of geography, history, religion, culture, economic 
structures, political tendencies or basic identity 
with the European states of the former Soviet 
Union. Except that they are all ‘neighbours’, it 
might be said. But even this is not accepted by the 
Eastern countries, who object: ‘we are not 
neighbours of Europe, we are Europe’. The EU’s 
decision of 2004 to place both groups in the same 
basket has been unwelcome for both groups. 
Given the extensive and complex acquis in Euro-
Mediterranean affairs, a rationalisation and 
improvement would require a painstaking and 
delicate effort. The Summit meetings in Paris on 
13-14 July 2008, could be the occasion for all ideas 
to be aired. Thereafter the European Commission 
could draw up a proposal, as would be normal for a 
project of the EU, and in particular taking into 
account the Commission’s thorough institutional 
knowledge.  
What functions should be addressed by the Union, 
and how should these functions be distributed 
between the three levels – coastal regions, coastal 
                                                      
14 5 EU member states (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy 
and Malta) meeting with 5 Southern states (Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya).   
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states, other EU member states and the EU 
institutions? In the complex reality of the EU many 
functions have become shared competences, with 
the EU setting out framework directives and 
contributing funding, with member states 
responsible for implementation. The same pattern 
emerges increasingly in the EU’s external relations, 
especially in its close neighbourhood relations. 
What therefore should be the model for shared 
competences in the UMed?      
The EU has actually been making progress in 
adapting its working methods for external policies 
that should not be needlessly encumbered with the 
attendance of all 27 member states.  
The Northern Dimension provides examples. The 
full members of the Northern Dimension Policy are 
now the EU (institutions), Norway, Iceland and 
Russia. The EU Baltic states are not themselves full 
members any more. However when meetings of 
officials and ministers take place, the EU is 
represented by the Presidency, the Commission and 
– on a voluntary basis – interested member states. 
This format is at times now being referred to as the 
‘open troika’, although this is only an informal 
term of art in the institutions. In practice at the 
most recent meetings of senior officials about six or 
seven member states were interested enough to 
attend, and these were mainly the Baltic member 
states. The principle remains that any member state 
may attend, and France has been among the 
participating non-Baltic states. At the next 
ministerial meeting of the Northern Dimension, the 
same formula will apply, and it may be that a larger 
number of member states will attend. 
At the same time there is a set of regional 
institutions – the Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) and the Barents-Euro Arctic Council – 
which belong to the coastal states alone, except that 
the European Commission is also now a member as 
the sole representative of the EU itself. However in 
the CBSS, in addition to the 11 full members,
15 
there are 7 further observer states that attend some 
meetings.
16 This is suggesting that when the 
functions in question are relatively technical and 
strongly connected to EU competences, pragmatic 
consensus can be found among the member states 
for this limited EU presence.  
                                                      
15The full member states are Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany as the 
coastal states, plus Iceland, Norway and the European 
Commission. 
16 The observer states are France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovakia, the UK and the US.  
The Black Sea sees comparable developments. The 
BSEC organisation has adopted a generous 
definition of Black Sea geography in taking in all 
three South Caucasus states and expanding more 
recently into the Balkans, with 12 full members.
17 
As a result of its Black Sea Synergy initiative the 
European Commission has now become an 
observer, joining 9 EU member states, Tunisia, 
Israel and the US, which are already observers.
18 At 
the first ministerial meeting between the EU and 
the BSEC states in Kiev on 14 February 2008, the 
EU was represented by the Presidency, the 
Commission, and all member states; but in the 
future the EU might resort to something analogous 
to the open Troika model, with the two Black Sea 
states (Bulgaria, Romania), the Commission and 
other interested member states. 
The ‘open Troika’ method could be of considerable 
importance in filling out the steps taken in the 
Lisbon Treaty to adapt the EU’s institutions to a 
much enlarged membership, and in particular to 
facilitate the development of foreign and security 
policies. The EU laboured greatly over necessary 
reforms of the Commission (number of members), 
the Council (voting rules, presidency) and the 
double-hatted High Representative. But there 
remain congestion problems of huge numbers of 
meetings at the levels of ministers, officials and 
experts. Useful developments such as the ‘open 
Troika’ method could be introduced without treaty 
changes. A further development of the ‘open 
Troika’ formula could see arrangements devised for 
informal constituency representation (e.g. for Baltic 
or Visegrad states in Mediterranean affairs).   
It seems that the Troika itself is going to be largely 
scrapped as a result of the imminent double-hatting 
of the High Representative and his/her 
chairmanship of the Council as well as Vice-
Presidency of the Commission. The Lisbon Treaty 
says that the “The President of the European 
Council shall, at his level and in that capacity [our 
italics], ensure the external representation of the 
Union on issues concerning its common foreign 
and security policy, without prejudice to the powers 
of the High Representative …” (Article 9 B). 
Implicitly at sub-summit level meetings the EU 
will be represented by the High Representative on 
                                                      
17 Full BSEC member states are the coastal states 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey 
and Ukraine, plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece 
and Serbia.  
18 BSEC observers are Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, 
Slovakia, Tunisia, the US and the European 
Commission.  
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behalf of both Council and Commission, but it 
remains to be seen whether the rotating Council 
Presidency will also be present in meetings that 
today see the Troika. 
‘Reinforced cooperation’ is a technique that exists 
for some time on paper in the treaties, but which 
has never been used. The key principles here are 
that there must be at least 9 member states, and that 
participation has to be open, with the Lisbon Treaty 
adding language to prevent ‘spoilers’ from 
participating. The text allows for the authorising 
decision to lay down conditions for participation, 
such as the capacity to be an effective contributor. 
In principle the financing of Reinforced 
Cooperation is to be borne by participating states 
rather than the EU budget.  
Finally, the confusing complexity of this 
EMP+ENP policy is already a serious 
communications problem for the EU’s public 
diplomacy. This was the product of the French-led 
position within the EU Council of Ministers in 
2004 in response to the initially proposed Wider 
Europe initiative for the new Eastern neighbours. It 
was argued that new favours extended to these 
Eastern neighbours should not relatively depreciate 
the existing EMP regime. Hence it was decided that 
the new neighbourhood policy should be a single 
ENP to serve both East and South. All concerned 
have been struggling to explain how EMP and ENP 
relate to each other ever since. There are 
explanations, namely that the ENP plausibly adds 
bilateral matter to the largely multilateral EMP, but 
this is only understood by small circles of officials, 
leaving the public uninformed or confused. But 
now the UMed would be stuck on top (or below), 
apparently without any rationalisation of the 
triptych: ‘EMP+ENP+UMed’. The confusion and 
credibility problems for EU communications policy 
towards the Mediterranean would be further 
worsened, unless the occasion was taken to 
rationalise and unify the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy into a single integrated whole. 
4.  The distribution of competences 
around the Mediterranean region 
Sarkozy’s proposal for a political, economic and 
cultural union of (or for) the coastal states of the 
Mediterranean raised fundamental questions as to 
how this would fit with the competences of the 
European Union. While the design of this long-
term political, economic and cultural union remains 
completely unspecified, the paper of 19 January 
2008, distributed by France to its EU partners, set 
out ideas for the possible initial content of the 
UMed. This corresponded to the earlier indications 
that a ‘project of projects’ is envisaged, with a 
listing of 15 regional agencies or similar initiatives 
(see Box 2).  
However there seems to have been no apparent 
attempt to analyse how these would fit with the 
existing competences of the EU, or how various 
existing sectoral policies and arrangements in these 
fields are actually functioning.   
Box 2. Projects suggested in a French note of 19 
January 2008 
1. Environment agency 
2. Energy office 
3. Transport agency 
4. University cooperation agency 
5. Research centre 
6. Culture office 
7. Agriculture office 
8. Public health centre 
9. SME development agency 
10. Infrastructure fund 
11. Financial innovation instrument 
12. Economic cooperation agency 
13. Migration office 
14. Judicial cooperation 
15. Civil protection centre 
 
The EU now has considerable experience in the 
organisation of multi-tier governance between 
itself, the member states and their regions, and 
increasingly also in the extension of this system 
beyond its frontiers in the regions and states of its 
periphery. The structures that have evolved involve 
some exclusive legal and executive competences of 
the EU, and many shared competencies. These 
shared competences have relatively strong EU 
responsibilities under Pillar I headings for the old 
EC competencies and Pillar III for the newer 
freedom, justice and security competences, which 
are now brought together under the Lisbon Reform 
Treaty. Under Pillar II for foreign and security 
policies, the decision-making procedures are more 
inter-governmental and dependent on unanimity, 
but the executive responsibilities of the EU as a 
whole are also substantial.    
It so happens that almost all of the technical 
projects being advanced by France for the UMed 
(as in Box 2) involve shared competencies of the 
EU and member states. However we start from a 
more strategic and comprehensive perspective.  
Three strategic issues. There are three strategic 
issues of politics, economics and security, which 
are inescapably matters of concern for the EU as a 
whole, rather than just for the coastal states. These 
are strikingly absent from the list of technical 
projects proposed, but nonetheless implicitly  
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covered in any meaningful idea of a political and 
economic union. It is difficult to conceive of any 
plan of strategic importance for the Mediterranean 
region without addressing these issues. The 
Sarkozy initiative may leave these domains of 
policy in the hand of the EU institutions for the 
time being, but there remains the double ambiguity: 
what substantive positions are being advocated on 
three inescapable issues? And what is the idea for 
their later inclusion in a political and economic 
union of (or for) the Mediterranean?   
A. The EU’s position on matters of political 
democracy and human rights lies at the heart of the 
EU’s ambition to be a normative foreign policy 
power and to project its values into its 
neighbourhood. For some member states to take 
these issues seriously but for others to neglect them 
is the recipe for total ineffectiveness. While the EU 
is very cautious in this domain in its current 
Mediterranean policy, the issue of recalibrating this 
aspect of foreign policy transcends the national 
level. Several Northern member states (both ‘old’ 
member states with considerable professional 
resources, and ‘new’ member states with recent 
experience of democratic transition processes) have 
been far more pro-active in this field than the 
Southern member states. 
Since 2004 there is already a Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly, attached to the Barcelona 
process, with 240 parliamentarians, half from the 
European parliament and half from the South 
Mediterranean states. In addition, since 2006 there 
is a Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean 
(PAM) bringing together parliamentarians of the 
coastal Mediterranean states, including those of the 
Adriatic: thus a quite striking duplication of effort. 
The list of PAM participants is virtually identical to 
that of the coastal states originally proposed for the 
UMed, but there is no mention of the body in the 
French proposal. 
B. The economic policy thrust of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy is centred around the 
deepening of the existing free trade agreements, 
with increasing extension of the EU’s regulatory 
norms into the service sectors, and more broadly 
into the reform of economic governance. To which 
might be added on the EU side further liberalisation 
of its trade policies in the field of agriculture. In 
addition the EU’s financial instruments have been 
undergoing significant development, with the 
FEMIP window of the European Investment Bank 
and the new Neighbourhood Investment Facility 
(NIF) of the Commission’s budgetary instrument 
(ENPI). These are areas of strong EU competences, 
in some cases exclusive.  
C. The main strategic security concern shared by 
the EU and its Mediterranean partners today is that 
of radical Islamic terrorism. This is certainly a 
matter for deep cooperation between the security 
services of member states, and notably for France, 
Italy and Spain in relation to the Al Qaeda 
franchise networks that are increasingly active in 
the Maghreb. But this also is a matter of strategic 
concern for the EU ministers of justice and interior 
affairs, just as the issue of reconciling European 
society with its new Muslim minorities is a matter 
of continental proportions. Related issues are the 
unresolved conflicts of the Mediterranean region. 
This concerns Palestine-Israel where the EU’s 
major effort has not been successful, but where 
scattered efforts of individual member states (or 
sub-groups) are even less likely to be effective; and 
the Western Sahara, where France and Spain might 
conceivably have developed a pro-active conflict 
resolution position, but they have so far left the 
initiative to the US and the UN, and the issue is 
absent from the current French proposal.    
Many technical issues. Here we comment briefly 
on how the 15 technical proposals relate to existing 
EU policies in these fields, with Euro-
Mediterranean ministers having been active on 
almost all of these topics at the policy level (as 
listed above). In addition the EU has in recent years 
greatly expanded the number of its own agencies, 
which now are 30 in number.
19 The Commission 
has recently comprehensively reviewed the 
practical possibilities for these agencies to be 
opened progressively in ENP partner states, and the 
Council has agreed that negotiations should begin 
along these lines. A variant to creating new 
Mediterranean agencies could be the opening of 
regional ‘windows’ or operating programmes 
involving the most interested states (analogous to 
the ‘open troika’ method). 
1. Environment agency. There is already a 
multiplicity of major initiatives – the UN-
sponsored ‘Barcelona Convention’ of coastal states, 
not to be confused with the environmental content 
of the EU-sponsored ‘Barcelona process’, and 
bilateral action programmes under the ENP, all of 
which are now being better brought together under 
the ‘Horizon 2020’ strategy adopted by the EU and 
South Mediterranean states in 2005. The idea of a 
new technical agency is not what is needed at this 
stage.   
                                                      
19 European Commission, “On the general approach to 
enable ENP partner states to participate in Community 
agencies and Community programmes”, COM(2006)724 
final, 4 December 2006.  
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2. Energy office. Euro-Med ministers of energy 
have adopted a work plan for 2008-2013, 
identifying 17 priority gas, oil and electricity 
infrastructure projects, as well as programmes for 
regulatory convergence. 
3. Transport agency. Euro-Med ministers have 
endorsed a list of 44 priority projects for the 
Mediterranean region for the years 2007-2013, as 
well as programmes for regulatory convergence. 
The international financial institutions are closely 
associated with these projects. 
4. University cooperation agency. In 2006 
ministers adopted a declaration aiming at a Euro-
Mediterranean area of education, advanced training 
and research by 2010. The Bologna process 
developed by the Council of Europe, and 
implemented in the EU, is also now serving as a 
guideline for reforms of higher education in the 
Maghreb; the related Tempus programme of the 
EU was opened to South-Mediterranean countries 
in 2003. 
5. Research centre. There are established EU-
funded networks of research institutes of the EU 
and South Mediterranean countries in the political 
(Euromesco) and economic (Femise) sciences, as 
well as provisions for South Mediterranean 
countries to be associated with the EU’s main 
Framework Programmes for research funding.  
6. Culture office. The Anna Lindh Foundation and 
Alexandria Library initiatives are promoting 
activity in this field, with substantial inputs from 
Northern EU member states. 
7. Agriculture office. There is substantial technical 
assistance being provided by the EU and bilateral 
programmes to aid the modernisation and 
convergence on EU regulatory standards of South 
Mediterranean agriculture.  
8. Public health centre. The ENP Action Plans 
involve cooperation over public health issues, 
including HIV/AIDS. Euro-Med foreign ministers 
envisage activity on the surveillance and control of 
communicable diseases, possibly to be guided by a 
ministerial meeting on public health. 
9. SME development agency, 10. Infrastructure 
fund, 11. Financial innovation instrument. These 
domains are explicitly covered by the substantial 
operations of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean 
Investment and partnership (FEMIP) administered 
by the European Investment Bank, and operations 
of the Bank itself.  
12. Economic cooperation agency. Economic 
analysis for the region is presently undertaken by 
the FEMISE network of research institutes (see 
point 5 above).  
13. Migration office. At the policy level the EU 
becomes inescapably concerned with immigration 
policy, since in the Schengen area especially purely 
national policies can no longer be effective. At the 
operational level, the EU Frontex agency brings 
resources from all member states to cope with ‘boat 
people’ emergencies of the Mediterranean region. 
14. Judicial cooperation. This is a growing field of 
cooperation bilaterally between the EU and 
individual South Mediterranean states within the 
framework of the Action Plans of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, and for cooperation with 
EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust.   
15. Civil protection centre. The Commission has 
developed a European Civil Protection function to 
facilitate EU solidarity in the face of civil 
emergencies such as forest fires and maritime 
disasters, of obvious relevance to the 
Mediterranean while needing to be able to call in 
resources from all the EU. 
In conclusion, there is already significant activity in 
the case of each one of the 15 initiatives proposed 
for the UMed, with the EU involved in all of them. 
Under the Sarkozy proposal it is indeed envisaged 
that the Commission would be fully associated with 
specific actions. However, given the extent of 
existing activities, it would seem advisable that 
there should be no broad-ranging political decision, 
such as simple endorsement of the list of agencies 
in Box 2 at Summit level, without a prior review on 
a case-by-case basis of existing projects and of the 
nature of weaknesses in the status quo. Each case 
would best be the subject of a report prepared by 
one or more independent experts, which should be 
published. Recommendations could consider the 
option of embedding new Mediterranean initiatives 
in existing EU agencies, as well as evaluation of 
the case for new stand-alone initiatives.  
5.  The EU’s North-South balance of 
interests 
There is also the matter of the strategic 
understanding within the EU and between the EU 
member states over the importance and character of 
the two branches of its present neighbourhood 
policy – East and South. Tensions over the relative 
priority between the two are a structural feature of 
EU politics, and these are naturally matters of vital 
interest. The overwhelming lesson of experience is 
that the EU has to maintain a balance between the 
interests of its Northern and Southern member 
states.   
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Whether this balance is to be achieved by seeking 
to apply the same strategy towards both regions is 
however questionable. The regions are very 
different in so many respects, and neither of them 
wants to co-habit the same EU policy box together. 
This was made very clear at the first and so far only 
plenary ministerial meeting of all neighbourhood 
countries convened by the Commission in 
September 2007. 
Sarkozy has proposed a new deal for the 
Mediterranean, raising the level of ambition for the 
EU’s coastal states present there. This proposal 
encountered objections from Northern member 
states, which do not wish their countries and the 
EU as a whole to be excluded from essential 
political initiatives and responsibilities in the 
region; nor do they wish the balance of EU 
priorities to be tilted towards the South. The first 
concern has, it seems, been met at least in part 
through recent meetings between Sarkozy and 
Merkel.  
On the second point there could be a strategic deal 
to be done within the EU, with a greater 
differentiation between the two branches of the 
neighbourhood policy.  
On the one hand, there could be a rationalisation of 
its Barcelona process and ENP with some 
enhancement of the role of the regional states 
within an ordered EU framework.  
On the other hand, with regard to the Eastern 
neighbours, there could be an enhancement of the 
EU’s strategy there, with a shift from 
neighbourhood without membership perspective, to 
a fresh approach that began to open up, at least 
initially for Ukraine and Moldova, precisely this 
membership perspective for the long-run, and in 
conformity with the standard Copenhagen criteria. 
This is what several European neighbours are 
persistently asking for, and what several Northern 
states are also advocating, and which could 
crucially enhance the incentive for these countries 
to converge more strongly on European values and 
standards. The balance between Northern and 
Southern interests would be further respected as the 
Black Sea and Northern Dimension regions also 
favour particular roles for the regional member 
states, anchored however in an EU policy 
framework and procedures.          
6.  Conclusions 
The Sarkozy initiative has raised two distinct sets 
of issues: on the one hand the political and 
economic performance of the South Mediterranean 
states, and on the other hand matters of political 
and institutional organisation on the EU side.  
These issues are of course not totally unrelated. 
However the relatively modest achievements of the 
EU’s Mediterranean policies so far should not be 
attributed essentially to difficulties in the 
institutional architecture of the Barcelona process 
and the ENP, but rather to the weakness of the 
policy input by the member states (both bilaterally 
and through EU policies), and to the stubborn 
obstacles to political and economic reforms in the 
Arab partner states.  
Weaknesses in present EU policies include extreme 
caution over issues of desirable democratic political 
reforms and respect for human rights, remaining 
restrictions in market access, especially for 
agricultural produce, greater mobility of persons 
and greater involvement in conflict resolution. On 
these issues the Mediterranean coastal states of the 
EU have been among the most conservative of 
member states. It would be an illusion to suppose 
that to pass the initiative to a sub-set of member 
states would achieve decisively better results, 
especially having regard to the list of very technical 
projects so far advanced for the UMed, and the lack 
of mention of strategic issues of politics. 
However the Sarkozy initiative could be taken up 
as an opportunity to rationalise and revitalize the 
EU’s present set of policies towards the 
Mediterranean, which is stuck in a condition of 
laborious lethargy.  Elements of this rationalisation 
could be the following: 
(a)  A single European Mediterranean policy. The 
present overlay of the Barcelona Process and 
the Southern branch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, to which might be 
added the UMed, is a hugely confusing 
handicap for the EU’s public diplomacy 
efforts to explain its policy towards the 
region. The ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ 
could be used as the name and symbol of a 
single overarching framework for EU 
relations with the Mediterranean, with a 
rationalisation and integration of the 
Barcelona process, the Southern branch of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and new 
ideas arising from the UMed initiative.  
(b)  Clarification of competences. Before 
presuming any kind of union of 
Mediterranean coastal states there should be a 
systematic review of the actual and most 
advisable distribution of competences on the 
EU side for policies towards this region - 
between the EU institutions and its 27 
member states, its 8 coastal member states of 
the region, and individual member states 
acting bilaterally.   
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(c)  Strategic domains for the EU as a whole. 
There is first of all a set of policy domains 
that are strategic for the EU as a whole, which 
therefore can hardly be delegated to the 
coastal states. These include the promotion of 
its political values of democracy and human 
rights, its main mechanisms of economic 
integration with the Euro-Mediterranean 
region (free trade, regulatory convergence, 
and financial mechanisms for budgetary 
grants and investments), migration policy and 
border management, and key security issues 
including the unresolved conflicts, 
radicalisation and terrorism. These major 
domains are for the EU a mix of exclusive 
and shared (with member states) 
competences. These could not revert to being 
exclusive competences of a sub-set of 
member states without seriously undermining 
the EU’s foreign and security policies.  
(d)  Matters based on regional geography. The 
tasks that could most plausibly devolved to 
coastal regional bodies would be relatively 
technical matters aspects of transport, 
environment, fisheries, border management 
and energy networks. But in all these cases 
there are already significant EU policy inputs 
already in the case of the Mediterranean, both 
by way of the EU’s framework legislation and 
its funding mechanisms, which means that 
there is very little policy matter to be 
devolved collectively to the coastal states.  
(e)  New regional agencies? There would also 
have to be a careful review of which (if any) 
of the 15 technical agencies proposed for the 
UMed would fill a real gap, and which would 
be duplicative and might be integrated into 
existing agencies. The Commission has 
recently set out a comprehensive review of its 
existing EU agencies with a view to their 
possible opening to participation by 
neighbouring countries, and the Council has 
welcomed this.  
(f)  Lightening of EU procedures. There is 
certainly a case for slimming down some of 
the heavy procedures of the Barcelona 
process with too many meetings now 
involving all 27 EU member states, as well as 
the 12 Barcelona partner states. There is now 
a menu of alternative procedures, on the basis 
of which some lightening of the present mix 
of procedures could be sought. The menu 
consists of i) the regular format of the EU 
institutions and the 27 member states, ii) the 
so-called ‘open Troika’ method, in which the 
EU is represented by the Presidency and 
Commission, accompanied by those member 
states that are most seriously interested, iii) 
cases where there may be full participation by 
some member states and the Commission, 
with observer or associate status for some 
others, and iv) the most technical cases where 
the Commission alone may represent the EU. 
The EU has in fact been developing 
sophisticated arrangements for its 
representation in other maritime regions on its 
periphery (for the Baltic and Barents Seas for 
years, and now also beginning for the Black 
Sea). However the choice of procedures has 
to respect graduations in intensity of political 
interests from the strategic to the purely 
technical.  
(g)  ‘Reinforced cooperation’? Another possible 
technique would be to use the ‘reinforced 
cooperation’ procedure now inscribed in the 
Lisbon Treaty. A key principle here is that the 
club has to be open to any seriously interested 
member state. This procedure, which has not 
yet been used in practice, may present some 
disadvantages of institutional and legal 
rigidity compared to a more supply ‘open 
Troika’ method. 
(h)  Extension to the Adriatic? The present French 
proposal to extend participation in the UMed 
beyond the existing ‘Barcelona’ states to 
include also the Adriatic states seems a 
questionable idea, since it would add to the 
congestion of meetings and to the political 
heterogeneity of participants. The Adriatic 
states are a sub-group of the Stabilisation and 
Association process for the Western Balkans 
(the French proposal is for the UMed to 
include Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and 
Bosnia, but not Serbia, Macedonia and 
Kosovo). 
(i)  Balancing Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhood interests. With a 
rationalisation and integration of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policies, there could be a 
greater differentiation of the present content 
of the Eastern and Southern branches of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, with each to 
evolve in accordance with its respective 
priorities and contexts, while no doubt 
retaining much in common. The balance 
between the regional interests of Northern and 
Southern member states of the EU will need 
to be respected in any enhancement of the 
level of ambition of the its Mediterranean 
policies and/or of the role of the Southern    
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member states. This could be satisfied by an 
enhancement of the existing neighbourhood 
policy towards the East European partner 
states (e.g. by granting long-run membership 
perspectives to countries such as Ukraine and 
Moldova). This could form the basis to a 
strategic deal between the member states, 
permitting advances in EU policy towards 
both East and South at the same time, but in a 
differentiated manner. 
How to proceed. It would seem that the Summit 
meetings convened for 13-14 July 2008 should best 
be the occasion for an open debate on all ideas for 
rationalising and strengthening Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation. If the conclusion were broadly to 
integrate Barcelona, ENP South and new UMed 
ideas in a single European Mediterranean policy, it 
would be a normal next step for the Commission to 
be invited to draw up a fully specified proposal on 
the basis of the Summit conclusions.  
 
Annex A 
Positions taken by leaders of Mediterranean partner states 
His Majesty the King of Morocco, 23 October 2007, speech before President Sarkozy [extract, our 
translation] 
…. 
“The neighbourhood policy of the European Union has reinforced the aspirations of Morocco to achieve an “Advanced 
Status”, giving its relations with the European Union the strategic dimension that is its due. This ambitious project will 
consecrate the pioneering role of my country in the rapprochement of the two sides of the Mediterranean. 
“This legitimate ambition has always been supported by the constant engagement of France in the workings of the 
European Union. We are convinced that the forthcoming French presidency of the European Union will bring an active 
contribution to the realisation of this objective.  
“You have, Mr President, taken the initiative to launch a visionary and audacious project, that of the Union of the 
Mediterranean. We are resolved to explore with you all the opportunities seeking to promote a novel and progressive 
partnership as envisaged, and an innovative and solidaristic taking in hand of the multiple challenges of our Mediterranean 
space.  
“The multiple challenges of globalisation call effectively the Mediterranean region to achieve a greater harmonisation of 
policies of collective security, sustainable development, and the management of cultures and faiths, in perfect articulation 
with the desired consolidation of the Barcelona process. The initiative of the Union of the Mediterranean will lay down, 
without doubt, the markers for a new pact between Europe and Africa, for which the Mediterranean will be the axis and 
pivot”.  
President Bouteflika of Algeria, 4 December 2007, speech before President Sarkozy [extract, our translation] 
.... 
“Mr President, I know that you promote the project for the Union of the Mediterranean to which you are particularly 
devoted and which you advocate with such energy and optimism. We have already discussed it, and I do not hide that I 
have not remained insensitive to your enthusiasm and that, in Algeria, we are disposed to contribute to its realisation to the 
extent that we will have to specify its contours and objectives, as well as the place it will take alongside the organisms that 
are already in place and which bring together the countries of the two sides of the Mediterranean.   
…. 
“It is clear that the North and South share the same aspirations for security, stability and prosperity. These aspirations can 
be satisfied in a climate of solidarity based on our unity in our diversity. But one cannot ignore the obstacles and the crises 
that will have to be overcome.  
“The most important of these crises is evidently that of the Middle East, where it becomes more urgent than ever to put an 
end to the Israeli occupation of Arab territory and to permit the Palestinian people to have the entire sovereignty of a 
viable state and recognition of its frontiers. 
“I believe that France in this context has always supported the respect of international law and the right of all peoples to 
self-determination. This has been so on several occasions and in particular for us directly, since after eight years of war of 
liberation that was costly in human lives, the Algerian people achieved independence in exercising their right to self-
determination. 
“This explains without doubt our entire solidarity with all peoples under foreign domination and who struggle for their 
right to self-determination. This is particularly the case of the people of the Western Sahara whose right to self-
determination is recognised internationally and must be exercised freely and without restrictions”.        
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Annex B 
Notes on the present organisation of some sectoral policies in the Mediterranean 
 
Environment 
The Mediterranean has come to see a plurality of frameworks and instruments attempting to address its 
environmental challenges. The oldest, since 1978, has been a system of cooperation of Mediterranean coastal states 
based on the Barcelona Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean against Pollution, supported by the UN. 
Parties to this Convention and its protocols include all EU coastal member states (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Slovenia and Spain) and the EU itself, as well as all non-EU coastal states. However more recently, within the 
framework  Barcelona process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - EMP) programmes have been devised at the 
regional and bilateral level to help the South Mediterranean states progress in line with the protocols, and major EU 
laws and projects such as Water Framework Directive of 2000. In 2005 the Barcelona summit of the EMP adopted 
the Horizon 2020 document aiming at tackling all major sources of pollution of the Mediterranean by that date. 
While the Barcelona Convention and Barcelona process were for years largely uncoordinated, this seems now to be 
changing for the better.
20 A detailed review of priority areas has recently been published by the European 
Environment Agency and the UN Environment Programme and its Mediterranean Action Plan.
21 The EU has been 
implementing the obligations flowing from the Barcelona Convention protocols through successive Council 
Decisions.
22 However the EEA-ENUP report noted that “regrettably the environment has not been consistently set 
out as a top priority by all partner states in development of these national programmes.”
23    
Transport 
Strategic planning for the Euro-Mediterranean region’s transport system is well developed in initiatives of the 
European Commission, as set out for example in the ‘High Level Group report of 2005 chaired by Loyola de 
Palacio
24, and more recently in a Regional Transport Action Plan for the Mediterranean Region for the years 2007-
2013.
25 These list 44 priority projects for the Mediterranean region, for ports, roads, railways, inland waterways, 
airports and inter-model connections. The plan has been endorsed by Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. 
The major international financial institutions, especially the EIB and World Bank are fully associated with these 
planning activities, and therefore positioned to follow though with investment financing. However the accent is on 
institutional and regulatory reform, as well as infrastructure projects. The regulatory issues involve a substantial 
degree of approximation by the Southern partner states on EU or international maritime, road, port and airline 
standards.  
Energy 
Energy cooperation is institutionalised through the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Energy, which 
held it fifth conference in December 2007. This adopted a detailed declaration, summarised under three priorities for 
2008-2013: 
- harmonisation of energy markets and legislations and to pursue the integration of energy markets in the Euro-
Mediterranean region;  
- sustainable development in the energy sector;  
- infrastructure extension, investment financing and research and development. 
                                                      
20 Oriol Costa Fernandez, “Dos Bareclonas para un Mar – la transformacion de la cooperation ambiental en el 
Mediterraneo”, CIDOB, Barcelona, January 2008. 
21 EEA, UNEP, “Priority Issues in the Mediterranean Environment”, EEA, Copenhagen, 2006 
22 As listed in EEA op cit, Table 10.1.  
23 EEA op.cit. p.69. 
24 High Level Group (chaired by Loyola de Palacio), ‘Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the 
neighbouring countries and regions’, November 2007.  
25 European Commission, ‘Regional Transport Action Plan for the Mediterranean Region for the years 2007-1013’, 
October 2007
25.   
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In particular the 2008-2013 plan identifies 17 energy infrastructure projects, including gas pipelines and 
interconnections, electricity interconnections and oil pipelines, which will be eligible for EIB financing. The various 
pipelines and interconnections are both south-south and south-north in nature.  
There is an existing association called MEDENER of energy management agencies of five EU Mediterranean states 
(France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and six Southern states (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority and Tunisia). 
Fisheries 
The FAO’s General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), whose initial agreement entered into 
force in 1952, brings together all coastal state of the region together with the European Commission, and can adopt 
binding recommendations on conservation and the management of living maritime resources. For the case of tuna 
fish the Mediterranean is covered by International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
which sets quantitative limits for allowable catches. The EU for its part, through the Common Fisheries Policy, has 
exclusive competence to negotiate fisheries agreements with third countries and represent the EU in regional 
fisheries bodies. The EU adopted in 2002 an Action Plan for the sustainability of fisheries in the Mediterranean, 
which concerns protection zones, and improvement of fishing techniques to reduce adverse impact on stocks
26. 
Recently the European Commissioner for fisheries drew attention to the mounting pressure on fisheries stocks in the 
Mediterranean, arguing that the GFCM was not functioning adequately (“has to be re-vitalised”), and that the EU’s 
legal framework is needed on matters such as trawling techniques and a reduction in fishing fleet capacities in both 
EU and non-EU member states. This is a clear case where there has to be a combination of EU measures (setting of 
norms, negotiations with non-EU states) and national implementation by the coastal states.   
Border management & migration 
All the coastal Mediterranean member states are in the front line facing huge migratory pressures, including the 
spectacular and often tragic trafficking of ‘boat people’ into the EU’s southern islands – Canary islands, Lampedusa, 
Malta, the Aegean islands, Cyprus. Given the realities of the completely open Schengen area, responsibility for both 
practical border management and more strategic issues of migration policy have gravitated towards a significant EU 
role in cooperation with member states. Border management is a regular chapter in the EU’s bilateral relations with 
the Mediterranean states (e.g. Action Plans of the ENP). The Frontex agency of the EU is operational, and since 
2005 it has been responsible for 30 joint operations at the EU’s external borders, including 9 operations consisting of 
countermeasures against illegal immigration flows at the EU’s Southern maritime borders. Resources in support of 
these operations are scarce, and the operating teams for southern operations include participation from several 
Northern member states.  
Financial institutions 
Three headings in Box 2 (SME development agency, an infrastructure fund and a financial innovation instrument) 
heavily overlap with the work of the European Investment Bank and its special window for the Mediterranean, the 
Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which joins EU budget funds with the loan 
and investment resources of the Bank.  These operations are on a large scale, with total EIB operations in the region 
of over €14 billion, and FEMIP financing amounting to €6 billion since its inception in 2002. In 2006 FEMIP funded 
projects in the fields of energy, environment, industry and SMEs, health and private equity. Some of Sarkozy’s 
earlier speeches have raised the question of a Mediterranean Investment Bank, presumably separate from the 
European Investment Bank. This is an idea already considered by the EU in the past, which resulted in a preference 
to develop the FEMIP special window at the EIB, rather than a new institution. There remain concerns that the EIB 
and FEMIP are too passive in their operations with regard to issues of economic policy and corporate governance. 
Here the example of the EBRD is cited, as a bank that has become skilled in blending its financial intervention with 
active concern for related policy issues. Given the declining need for EBRD operations in the most advanced 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, there is a case for mandating the EBRD to open up activity in 
the Mediterranean.   
Civil emergencies 
The European Commission environment services has developed a European Civil Protection function designed to 
facilitate EU solidarity in the face of civil emergencies, of which for the Mediterranean region the problems of forest 
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fires and maritime disasters and pollution are of special relevance. A Monitoring and Information Centre has been 
established, to serve as information hub and coordinating mechanism.  
Maritime policy 
The European Commission published in June 2007 a Green Paper proposal for a Community Maritime Policy, which 
would seek to integrate all elements of EU policy bearing upon the seas an and coastal regions and ports.
27 This led 
in to a formal proposal to the Council and Parliament for an Integrated Maritime Policy,
28 which the European 
Council adopted in December 2007. The priority domains of sectoral policy which the Action Plan seeks to integrate 
are: 
-  A European maritime transport space without barriers 
-  A European strategy for maritime research 
-  National integrated maritime policies of member states 
-  A roadmap towards maritime spatial planning by member states 
-  A strategy to mitigate the effects of climate change on coastal regions 
-  Reduction of CO2 emission and pollution by shipping 
-  Elimination of pirate fishing and destructive bottom trawling 
-  A European network of maritime clusters 
-  A review of EU labour law exemptions for shipping and fishing sectors 
Presumably, as and when this maritime policy develops in practice, it will be applied explicitly to individual seas – 
the Mediterranean, Black Sea, etc.   
                                                      
27 “Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: a European vision for the oceans and seas”, COM(2006)275 final, 7 
June 2007. 
28 “An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union”, COM(2007)575 final, 10 October 2007. About CEPS
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